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To summarize, the Rambam’s explanation of why sacrificing a fetus to save its mother is permissible is linked to the concept of a “rodef.” In order to delve deeper into the Rambam’s reasoning, it is essential to explore the concept of a “rodef” and the justification for killing a pursuer.
Let’s begin by examining the Torah sources that support the permissibility of killing a rodef:
The Mishna in Sanhedrin 73a explicitly states:
And these are the ones who are saved at the cost of their lives: One who pursues another to kill him…
It is crucial to note that the Mishna uses the language of “saving” in the context of killing the rodef. While the Mishna does not specify who is being saved, the Ran (Sanhedrin 73a) asserts that killing the rodef is a mitzvah and not merely a permission.
Moreover, the Mishna does not clarify whether killing the rodef is an obligation or a permissive act. Nevertheless, it is emphasized that every effort must be made to stop the rodef through non-lethal means before resorting to lethal force. Killing the rodef should only be considered as a last resort when all other options have been exhausted.
Although the concept of killing a rodef is complex and often viewed as a secondary choice, the fundamental question remains:
Why is it permissible, or even mandated, to kill a rodef? Unlike other scenarios in the Torah, where one life cannot be sacrificed to save another, the case of a rodef presents a unique ethical dilemma. While the rodef is indeed attempting to kill someone, the question arises as to why this justifies taking his life when he has not yet committed the crime.
Various perspectives exist on this matter, each offering a distinct rationale. Before delving into the interpretations of the Rishonim and textual sources, let’s explore the spectrum of possible explanations:
Reasons for Killing a Rodef
- Saving the rodef from sin
One perspective suggests that killing the rodef is an act of kindness aimed at preventing him from committing the grave sin of murder. By intervening, we are essentially saving the rodef from perpetrating a heinous act. This viewpoint aligns with the interpretation of the Ben Sorer U’Morer concept, where judgment is based on the individual’s current trajectory to avert undesirable outcomes.
- Deserving of death
Alternatively, it is posited that the rodef incurs a death penalty for attempting to take a life. This can be justified in two ways: either by considering the rodef as having already committed murder or by deeming the act of attempted murder as inherently deserving of capital punishment.
In this scenario, the rodef’s actions warrant his demise, not as a trade-off for another life but as a consequence of his intent to kill. While killing the rodef is not the preferred course of action, it becomes a mitzvah if all other options fail to halt his pursuit.
- Rescuing the victim
A third perspective suggests that the concept of a rodef transforms the ethical calculus of prioritizing one life over another. While conventional wisdom prohibits sacrificing one life to save another, the case of a rodef introduces a paradigm shift.
Two key factors contribute to this shift: firstly, the prohibition against murder is lifted when the rodef poses a direct threat, and secondly, the principle of “mei chazis” (uncertainty over whose life is more valuable) no longer applies in this context. Either the victim’s life is inherently more valuable in the eyes of Hashem, or the rodef’s actions forfeit his claim to equal consideration, thereby justifying the prioritization of the victim’s life.
These divergent perspectives shed light on the nuanced rationale behind the permissibility of killing a rodef. In our subsequent article, we will delve further into this intriguing halachic topic.